Reply to: Database Encryption

[quackhandle]

Easy fix for the latter. Create a new group on the system with rights required for the application to to run and add the SQL user to that. Never, ever, ever allow anything to run as root/admin.

Make sure to he ask the devs what rights the SQL ussr needs and then ask them why they don't know when they can't tell you. It's their App, they should know. Make sure management / the security team are cc'd in the conversation.

Yes, you'd think that.

qh

[DaveB]

Encryption of data at rest is really only protection against someone stealing the data when it’s at rest. That sounds obvious but it’s key.
To steal DB data at rest the thief needs access to the DB files or hardware. In reality that means it’s an attack at the OS/physical.

You are assuming encryption at rest can only happen at the disk level. Encryption in the DB at application level prevents that. Even physical / OS access will not allow access. Take a look at Oracle TDE as an example.

To be useful the data needs to be decrypted, by he DB before being given anywhere, and probably encrypted again for transport. This is the weak point. Oddly enough if you don’t encrypt data at rest the weak point is the same point.
So if you encrypt data at rest you are strengthening an already strong point in the chain.

No, if the DB is transmitting data to another system/application over TLS etc. then it encrypts the packets within the application, before it leaves the DB. There is no point outside the application where it appears in plain text.

If you don't encrypt at rest then anyone with physical or logical access to the file store holding the data can read it. Thats the weak point. Full disk encryption works for anyone stealing the hardware or not having appropriate OS rights on the system, but doesn't protect against rogue sys admins etc. Encryption at the DB application level, such as Oracle TDE, makes sure that only those DB users and admins with appropriate access can read the data.

Yes, those users could in theory copy the data in plain text form to another location via copy/paste, exporting etc. but your DB users should be trusted and trained not to do that and the application / system config should also prevent them from doing it. They should also only have access to those tables etc in the DB that they actually need access to for the role. This is why account security is so important and why phishing / social engineering attacks can be so effective.

IMO it’s a waste of time and effort. And user credential protection for the DB admins is still the best way to improve data protection.

No, again, if you don't encrypt at rest, preferably at the DB level then you leave your data open to any who gains access to the files. Legitimately or otherwise.

The only time that rest encryption makes real sense is when you perceive the threat to be the OS admins. And bluntly if they’re the problem then you’re ****ed.

That's why you encrypt at the application level and not the OS level. You need encryption at rest in the DB rather than the OS to meet your Data Protection commitments to only allow access to the data by those who actually require that access. SysAdmins / Support staff have no reason to be looking at personal data and should not be able to. Encrypt the DB at the application level and not the OS level and you can achieve that. DBA's should be someone on the same team as the DB users and vetted for access in the same way.

Combine encryption in the application and good account security with properly configured transaction logging and you are mitigating the vast majority of the risks.

[Lance]

Encryption of data at rest is really only protection against someone stealing the data when it’s at rest. That sounds obvious but it’s key.
To steal DB data at rest the thief needs access to the DB files or hardware. In reality that means it’s an attack at the OS/physical.

To be useful the data needs to be decrypted, by he DB before being given anywhere, and probably encrypted again for transport. This is the weak point. Oddly enough if you don’t encrypt data at rest the weak point is the same point.
So if you encrypt data at rest you are strengthening an already strong point in the chain.

IMO it’s a waste of time and effort. And user credential protection for the DB admins is still the best way to improve data protection.

The only time that rest encryption makes real sense is when you perceive the threat to be the OS admins. And bluntly if they’re the problem then you’re ****ed.

[stek]

Easy fix for the latter. Create a new group on the system with rights required for the application to to run and add the SQL user to that. Never, ever, ever allow anything to run as root/admin.

Make sure to he ask the devs what rights the SQL ussr needs and then ask them why they don't know when they can't tell you. It's their App, they should know. Make sure management / the security team are cc'd in the conversation.

Use Centrify. Great product.

[DaveB]

In most places this is usually the DBA, as it's the only person who understands encryption. (right or wrong).



The bain of my life, developers demanding sysadmin on production to run their awful code (okay I am generalising) however far worse is the bad applications that won't run unless the SQL login has sysadmin rights. /rantover

qh

Easy fix for the latter. Create a new group on the system with rights required for the application to to run and add the SQL user to that. Never, ever, ever allow anything to run as root/admin.

Make sure to he ask the devs what rights the SQL ussr needs and then ask them why they don't know when they can't tell you. It's their App, they should know. Make sure management / the security team are cc'd in the conversation.

[darrylmg]

So with all the GDPR stuff going on everyone is starting to go on about database encryption.

Ok not a new subject but seems to be everyone thinks it is the solution to anybody stealing your data.

However the push back we are getting is the performance overhead which comes with database encryption means that the business could not operate.

Also there is concern that your 'head of database encryption' is now a targeted person and if someone really wants your data them and their family could be at risk.

Does any of you tech geniuses have any thoughts on this subject?

TIA

Also maybe consider:
- the Intel chipset bugs that allow anyone to snoop on the CPU cache. This is highly unlikely but you never know...

- is your DB vendor software decrypting the data when it loads it into memory.

- as others have said, the strength of your policies around segregation of duties.

- the worldly location of support staff (are they in countries/locations that lack basic physical security measures)

- the frequency of turnover of staff (general disgruntalledness).

[quackhandle]

Correctly set up the only person who would have access to the encryption keys would be the sysadmin responsible for managing the database environment, not the DBA.

In most places this is usually the DBA, as it's the only person who understands encryption. (right or wrong).

However none of this addresses the major vulnerability which is the database user accounts. If you don't have good account security for the database users anyone gaining access to an account will be able to extract and remove the data in clear text anyway because thats what they are allowed to do. It's far easier to mount a phishing / social engineering attack to obtain account credentials than trying to threaten an individual who probably doesn't have the access you need anyway.

The bain of my life, developers demanding sysadmin on production to run their awful code (okay I am generalising) however far worse is the bad applications that won't run unless the SQL login has sysadmin rights. /rantover

qh

[DaveB]

So with all the GDPR stuff going on everyone is starting to go on about database encryption.

Ok not a new subject but seems to be everyone thinks it is the solution to anybody stealing your data.

However the push back we are getting is the performance overhead which comes with database encryption means that the business could not operate.

Also there is concern that your 'head of database encryption' is now a targeted person and if someone really wants your data them and their family could be at risk.

Does any of you tech geniuses have any thoughts on this subject?

TIA

Database encryption is not the be all and end all. GDPR is about much more than just have a technology solution in place.

Performance overheads are a historical issue that has been addressed and any remaining overheads can be minimised though proper configuration. In general if you use things like Oracle TDE and encrypt the entire data base rather than trying to do it at row or column level your overheads wont be noticeable in the real world. The only time you may see a significant impact is if your hardware is already under specced.

Correctly set up the only person who would have access to the encryption keys would be the sysadmin responsible for managing the database environment, not the DBA. Other than being read back by the database system to decrypt data when it is legitimately accessed they should only be accessible from the physical console of the server they are stored on.

However none of this addresses the major vulnerability which is the database user accounts. If you don't have good account security for the database users anyone gaining access to an account will be able to extract and remove the data in clear text anyway because thats what they are allowed to do. It's far easier to mount a phishing / social engineering attack to obtain account credentials than trying to threaten an individual who probably doesn't have the access you need anyway.

[SeanT]

- Right to be forgotten, how do we anonymise data but also make it available should say pension queries arise 5 years later?

You have a valid and legally sound reason to keep the data and to refuse the request for it to be "forgotten". GDPR doesn't trump e.g. FCA regulation or AML laws.

[SeanT]

Encrypt the data that needs encrypting (possibly very little of it) at the application level if you can, then use something like Hashicorp Vault to store the key material needed to decrypt it, which can be leased by the application and periodically renewed. Don't forget to consider the integrity and lifecycle of your backups (it may make sense to decrypt and re-encrypt with different key material with a longer validity and to include decryption in your automated restore testing).

[original PM]

I'm no tech genius but am having all sorts of issues with this GDPR stuff. I'm running a Global HCM implementation in the cloud and there are a raft of requirements we can't currently handle. Probably hampered by the fact it is SaaS and hence access to all areas of source code / database are restricted but examples include:

- Right to be forgotten, how do we anonymise data but also make it available should say pension queries arise 5 years later?
- How do we delete data when people leave or are terminated but keep sufficient information on them so that if they are re-hired they can be identified as having worked there previously
- How do we delete / anonymise all related documents / attachments associated with their emloyee records when they leave without screwing up downstream and down the line reporting requirements

etc etc

And these are all the other questions about feasibility.

I am happy to delete/anonymise/archive whatever data we have to.

As long as whoever is making the rules understands that if someone wants that data for some reason it will not be available.

[oracleslave]

Does any of you tech geniuses have any thoughts on this subject?

TIA

I'm no tech genius but am having all sorts of issues with this GDPR stuff. I'm running a Global HCM implementation in the cloud and there are a raft of requirements we can't currently handle. Probably hampered by the fact it is SaaS and hence access to all areas of source code / database are restricted but examples include:

- Right to be forgotten, how do we anonymise data but also make it available should say pension queries arise 5 years later?
- How do we delete data when people leave or are terminated but keep sufficient information on them so that if they are re-hired they can be identified as having worked there previously
- How do we delete / anonymise all related documents / attachments associated with their emloyee records when they leave without screwing up downstream and down the line reporting requirements

etc etc

[original PM]

Do you know anything about encryption? Why would the head of db encryption know the keys to decrypt the data?

That was the point - so do we assume that no one can decrypt the data without the relevant keys/systems.

But can the keys/systems be hacked?

Or rather what happens to encrypted data when you lose the 'key' - is it possible to get it back?

I suppose the sum up the question does the reduction in the possible risk you get by encrypting your data outweigh the overheads of encryption.

And if we assume no system is 100% safe and all systems and data are hackable are you really making a huge difference by encrypting data?

Just asking really??

[NotAllThere]

Also there is concern that your 'head of database encryption' is now a targeted person and if someone really wants your data them and their family could be at risk.

Do you know anything about encryption? Why would the head of db encryption know the keys to decrypt the data?

[original PM]

The weak link will be where the encrypted data needs to be decrypted, i.e. an endpoint, so not necessarily a person that will be targeted.

Rather than look at one aspect of security the whole infrastructure needs appraising.

Well this is the thing for the past x years we have been increasing security etc etc etc

Data is encrypted in transit - firstly it was just data coming into or leaving our data centres, then it was data within the data centres and now it is at rest data.

So in essence what we are saying is that it is impossible for someone to hack into our network (false really because nothing is 100% unhackable but..)

But if someone did hack the network all the data is password protected.

And any data which is moving around is encrypted so even if you could intercept the message the data would be meaningless.

And then we are going to start to encrypted at rest data - which really means encrypting either all of the database or just the PII portions of the databases.


Is this all worth it?

Will this sort of thing just become 'standard' over the next few years anyway?