This is what you need for SIA to actually work as advertised:
You need people around the world to have their own mini servers running 24/7 and joining the SIA Network so that they all behave like a huge RAID system. This is quite a commitment, as all this NEEDS to be cheaper than what the big guys can provide. I would need to invest around £800+ in a NAS with 3 HDs, set them in RAID 5, this means that 12TB would provide 8TB of space to be used by the public/private. If you decide to be a host part of the bigger SIA network then standard RAID0 set-up so you would have 12TB to use. You would also need to take in consideration cooling and electricity bills.
This is the rule which to me sounds extremely complicated:
Since you want to make sure that your data is accessible at all times and no one can take it you would go with the full SIA network RAID solution:
If the client is storing data on 30 hosts but accesses it from 10 it actually sounds like a pretty expensive storage solution. Every time the client downloads a file they have to pay. I would really like to know what the fees are. Do you pay 30 people to store your data or just 10? How much would that come down to if you include the downloads? This solution looks like it is only viable for people that need stuff storing like a safe deposit box, only access when critical. If it is used as a daily data access for corporates... would it even be worth it for them?
The rules:
You need people around the world to have their own mini servers running 24/7 and joining the SIA Network so that they all behave like a huge RAID system. This is quite a commitment, as all this NEEDS to be cheaper than what the big guys can provide. I would need to invest around £800+ in a NAS with 3 HDs, set them in RAID 5, this means that 12TB would provide 8TB of space to be used by the public/private. If you decide to be a host part of the bigger SIA network then standard RAID0 set-up so you would have 12TB to use. You would also need to take in consideration cooling and electricity bills.
This is the rule which to me sounds extremely complicated:
A file contract is an agreement between a renter and a host. The renter agrees to pay the host for storing a file, and the host agrees to store the file for a certain period of time. The renter and the host both put money into the file contract at the beginning. The money from the renter will be payment for the host after the contract is fulfilled. The money from the host is collateral that the host will forfeit if the contract is not completed. The file contract goes onto the blockchain, which will serve as escrow. When the file contract is over, the host must provide a proof of storage to the blockchain proving that the file is still being stored. After the proof of storage is provided, the host's collateral is returned and the renter's payment is made to the host. If the proof of storage is not provided in time, the money is forfeit.
In a 10-of-30 scheme, you only need 10 hosts to recover your data. Downloads on Sia are paid, which means a host gets revenue every time you download data from them. If 1 or even 15 hosts are malicious and try to hold data hostage, they can be fully ignored and instead the non-malicous hosts can be used. This has a direct opportunity cost for the malicious hosts - they lose revenue from the downloads. Even further, the renters will blacklist hosts if their download prices are consistently too high.
The rules:
- Hosts are given a score, and then selected randomly according to their score
- The score goes up linearly with the number of coins burned - a linear relationship is required to prevent Sybil attacks
- Hosts are heavily penalized if their uptime is below 95%, and there is not a significant advantage to having an uptime greater than 99%. That is because the trust model explicitly chooses to assume that no host is more reliable than 99% - while the historic reliability is there the chance of betrayal or malice is also always present. 99% reliability across a 20-of-30 scheme is far more than sufficient to guarantee overall file reliability.
- Hosts are penalized exponentially for having a price that is higher than expected, but are not preferred exponentially for having a price that is lower than expected. 'Expected' is still undefined, but will likely be determined based on the real world cost of hard drives. Low prices cannot be preferred exponentially because this leaves room for Sybil attackers to get preference by setting the price too low. A host that is 2x the reasonable cost will have 1/32 the score, but a host that is 1/2 the reasonable cost will likely only have 2x the score.
- Host scores are increased linearly with the amount of collateral provided on the data, and a minimum amount of collateral is required. (to insulate against things like price volatility).
- Hosts that demonstrate dishonesty are blacklisted.
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