Originally posted by BrilloPad
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As Radice rightly argues, there are various explanations for the causes of the IMF crisis. But however it began, the result was a dramatic reduction in international confidence and the fear that sterling would collapse. It was generally believed that the situation could be redeemed only by an international loan that required the government to make certain economic "adjustments", to convince the IMF that the loan would not be squandered. Denis Healey, by then Chancellor of the Exchequer, thought the price had to be paid. Tony Crosland, the foreign secretary, did not. Neither did I.
Radice rightly reports that, in the cabinet, I alone "backed Crosland to the end, but later conceded that after all, Healey had been correct". In fact, I was eventually convinced of Healey's view, graphically expressed at the time by Gavyn Davies, then economic adviser to the prime minister. The "markets wanted blood", and had to be propitiated by an unreasonable sacrifice. As we now know, the markets based their demands on Treasury statistics that turned out to be categorically wrong. The sacrifice for which they called was a reduction in the public sector borrowing - a result achieved partly by cuts in social services. In fact, it turned out that the Treasury had grossly overestimated the size of the public sector borrowing requirement. The cuts were unnecessary.
Yet Healey was right. At that moment, in 1976, survival required the government to pay the market's price, which amounted to providing proof that it would abandon socialism in favour of stability.
Radice rightly reports that, in the cabinet, I alone "backed Crosland to the end, but later conceded that after all, Healey had been correct". In fact, I was eventually convinced of Healey's view, graphically expressed at the time by Gavyn Davies, then economic adviser to the prime minister. The "markets wanted blood", and had to be propitiated by an unreasonable sacrifice. As we now know, the markets based their demands on Treasury statistics that turned out to be categorically wrong. The sacrifice for which they called was a reduction in the public sector borrowing - a result achieved partly by cuts in social services. In fact, it turned out that the Treasury had grossly overestimated the size of the public sector borrowing requirement. The cuts were unnecessary.
Yet Healey was right. At that moment, in 1976, survival required the government to pay the market's price, which amounted to providing proof that it would abandon socialism in favour of stability.
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