3.3.3. The example of the German Federal Intelligence Service
Department 2 of the German Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) obtains information through the interception of foreign communications. This activity was the subject of a review by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The details made public during the court proceedings (23), combined with the evidence given to the Temporary Committee on 21 November 2000 by Mr Ernst Uhrlau, the coordinator for the secret services in the Federal Chancellor's Office, give an insight into the scope for obtaining intelligence by intercepting satellite communications (until May 2001 the FIS was not authorised to intercept foreign cable communications in Germany).
On the basis of differing legal provisions or the availability of a greater number of analysts, the capabilities of other intelligence services may be greater in detail terms in given areas. In particular, the monitoring of cable traffic increases the statistical likelihood of success, but not necessarily the number of communications which can be analysed. In fundamental terms, in your
rapporteur's view the example of the FIS demonstrates the capabilities and strategies employed by foreign intelligence services in connection with the monitoring of foreign communications, even if those services do not disclose such matters to the public.
The FIS endeavours, by means of strategic telecommunications monitoring, to secure information from foreign countries about foreign countries. With that aim in view, satellite transmissions are intercepted using a series of search terms (which in Germany must be authorised in advance by the so-called G10 Committee (24).
The relevant figures break down as follows (year 2000): of the roughly 10 million international communications routed to and from
Germany every day, some 800 000 are transmitted via satellite. Just under 10% of these (75 000) are filtered through a search engine. In your rapporteurís view, this limitation is not imposed by the law (in theoretical terms, and at least prior to the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, a figure of 100% would have been allowable), but derives from technical
restrictions, e.g. the limited capacity for analysis.
(20)Major A. Andronov, Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No 12, 1993, 37-43.
(21)Information supplied privately to the rapporteur (source protected).
(22)Information supplied privately to the rapporteur (source protected).
(23)BverfG, 1 BvR 2226/94, 14 July 1999, paragraph 1. PE 305.391 36/194 RR\445698EN.doc
(24)Law on the restriction of the privacy of posts and telecommunications (law on Article 10 of the Basic Law) of 13 August 1968.
Department 2 of the German Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) obtains information through the interception of foreign communications. This activity was the subject of a review by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The details made public during the court proceedings (23), combined with the evidence given to the Temporary Committee on 21 November 2000 by Mr Ernst Uhrlau, the coordinator for the secret services in the Federal Chancellor's Office, give an insight into the scope for obtaining intelligence by intercepting satellite communications (until May 2001 the FIS was not authorised to intercept foreign cable communications in Germany).
On the basis of differing legal provisions or the availability of a greater number of analysts, the capabilities of other intelligence services may be greater in detail terms in given areas. In particular, the monitoring of cable traffic increases the statistical likelihood of success, but not necessarily the number of communications which can be analysed. In fundamental terms, in your
rapporteur's view the example of the FIS demonstrates the capabilities and strategies employed by foreign intelligence services in connection with the monitoring of foreign communications, even if those services do not disclose such matters to the public.
The FIS endeavours, by means of strategic telecommunications monitoring, to secure information from foreign countries about foreign countries. With that aim in view, satellite transmissions are intercepted using a series of search terms (which in Germany must be authorised in advance by the so-called G10 Committee (24).
The relevant figures break down as follows (year 2000): of the roughly 10 million international communications routed to and from
Germany every day, some 800 000 are transmitted via satellite. Just under 10% of these (75 000) are filtered through a search engine. In your rapporteurís view, this limitation is not imposed by the law (in theoretical terms, and at least prior to the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, a figure of 100% would have been allowable), but derives from technical
restrictions, e.g. the limited capacity for analysis.
(20)Major A. Andronov, Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No 12, 1993, 37-43.
(21)Information supplied privately to the rapporteur (source protected).
(22)Information supplied privately to the rapporteur (source protected).
(23)BverfG, 1 BvR 2226/94, 14 July 1999, paragraph 1. PE 305.391 36/194 RR\445698EN.doc
(24)Law on the restriction of the privacy of posts and telecommunications (law on Article 10 of the Basic Law) of 13 August 1968.
Comment