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[Moscow Mule]

Mikawa's cruiser's aircraft returned by 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. Mikawa reassembled his warships and began his run towards Guadalcanal, entering the Slot near Choiseul by 16:00 on August 8. Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships,
“ On the rush-in we will go from S. (south) of Savo Island and torpedo the enemy main force in front of Guadalcanal anchorage; after which we will turn toward the Tulagi forward area to shell and torpedo the enemy. We will then withdraw north of Savo Island.[24] ”

[Moscow Mule]

Mikawa's run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the The Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day.[25]

[Moscow Mule]

To protect the unloading transports during the night, Crutchley divided the Allied warship forces into three groups. A "southern" group, consisting of the Australian cruisers Australia and HMAS Canberra, cruiser USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Patterson and USS Bagley, patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A "northern" group, consisting of the cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria and USS Quincy, and destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson, conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An "eastern" group consisting of two U.S. cruisers and two U.S. destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands.[26] Crutchley placed two radar-equipped U.S. destroyers to the west of Savo Island to provide early warning for any approaching Japanese ships. The destroyer USS Ralph Talbot patrolled the northern passage and the destroyer USS Blue patrolled the southern passage, with a gap of 12-30 kilometres (8-20 mi) between their uncoordinated patrol patterns. At this time, the Allies were unaware of all of the limitations of their primitive ship-born radars, such as the effectiveness of the radar could be greatly degraded by the presence of nearby landmasses.[27] Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages.[28]

[Moscow Mule]

The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings. Also, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and "inviting weary sailors to slackness." In response, most of Crutchley's warships went to "Condition II" the night of August 8, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations.[29]

[Moscow Mule]

In the evening, Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift to discuss the withdrawal of Fletcher's carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55, Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode of Chicago in charge of the southern group. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the "seaplane tender" force. They decided it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location.[30]

[Moscow Mule]

As Mikawa's force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final scout of the Allied ships, and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.[31]

[Moscow Mule]

Mikawa's force approached in a single 3 kilometre (2 mi) column led by Chōkai, with Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yubari, and Yunagi following. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9, lookouts in Mikawa's ships spotted Blue about 9 kilometres (5.5 mi) ahead of the Japanese column.[32]

[Moscow Mule]

Action south of Savo

To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island.[33] He also ordered his ships to slow to 22 knots, to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible.[34] Four minutes later, Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 16 kilometres (10 mi) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality.[35][36] The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them.[33] When Blue was less than 2 kilometres (1 mi) away from Mikawa's force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her.[37] Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to 26 knots, and then to 30 knots. At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, "Every ship attack."[38]

[Moscow Mule]

At about this time, Yunagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps she was ordered to provide a "rear guard" for Mikawa's force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. This ship was the destroyer Jarvis, heavily damaged the day before and now departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, since her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed.[39] The Japanese ships passed as close to 1,100 metres of Jarvis, close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer's decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way.[40]

[Moscow Mule]

Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12,500 metres away, silhouetted by the glow from the burning George F. Elliot.[41] Several minutes later, at about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships.[42] At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 16 kilometres (10 mi).[43] Chōkai turned to face this new threat, and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire