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[Moscow Mule]

Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, "anxious" about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening of August 8.[12]

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Some historians contend that Fletcher's fuel situation wasn't at all critical but that Fletcher implied that it was to justify his withdrawal from the battle area.[13] Fletcher's biographer notes that Fletcher concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for close air support were at hand. But concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes and wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9. [14]

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Even though the unloading was going slower than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover, he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart sometime during the next day.[15]

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Japanese response

Unprepared for the Allied operation at Guadalcanal, the initial Japanese response included airstrikes and an attempted reinforcement. Mikawa, commander of the newly formed Japanese Eighth Fleet headquartered at Rabaul, loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7. However, when the Japanese learned how many Allied troops had landed on Guadalcanal, the transports were recalled.[16]

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Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal. At Rabaul were the heavy cruiser Chōkai (Mikawa's flagship), light cruisers Tenryū and Yubari, and one destroyer, Yunagi. En route from Kavieng were four heavy cruisers under Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa.[17]

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The Japanese Navy trained extensively in night fighting tactics before the war, a fact that the Allies were unaware of.[18] Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8 and August 9, when he could employ his night battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George in the evening of August 7 and then headed east-southeast. [19]

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Battle

[edit] Prelude
Approach route of Mikawa's warship force for the battle from Rabaul and Kavieng (upper left), pausing off the east coast of Bougainville (center) and then traveling down The Slot the evening of August 8 to attack Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi (lower right).
Approach route of Mikawa's warship force for the battle from Rabaul and Kavieng (upper left), pausing off the east coast of Bougainville (center) and then traveling down The Slot the evening of August 8 to attack Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi (lower right).

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Mikawa decided to lead his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8. (This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal.) [20] Then they would proceed along the dangerous channel known as "The Slot", hoping that no Allied plane would sight him in the fading light. But the Japanese fleet was sighted in St. George Channel, where their column almost ran into the submarine USS S-38, lying in ambush. She was too close to fire torpedoes, though, but her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed:

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TWO DESTROYERS AND THREE LARGER SHIPS OF UNKNOWN TYPE HEADING ONE FOUR ZERO TRUE AT HIGH SPEED EIGHT MILES WEST OF CAPE ST. GEORGE.[21]

Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons.

At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Australian Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea.[22] The first Hudson to sight Mikawa's warships identified them as "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders."

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The Hudson's crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. But receiving no acknowledgment, they abandoned the patrol and returned to Milne Bay (at 12:42) to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible.

The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio but completed its patrol, landing at Milne Bay at 15:00, and then reported sighting "two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type."

For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8.[23]