Hillsborough - 20 years on

[ookook]

[QUOTE=SallyAnne;819543]If 1000 people turned up for a train without a ticket, hoping to get one from the station (which is normal), and instead were found to be in a heavy crowd, waded into a jam packed train, which crushed them half to death because of the incompatence of the train company and police...would that be my their fault too?

What about if 1000 people turned up for a train without a ticket - then decided they'd all rush onto the crowded train because there wasn't sufficient train guards to stop them? So the train guards were forced to open the doors, they opened the wrong doors and the crowd swarmed in and crushed people.

Its a trite example and the actual event was a tragedy with many failings and many lives ruined (I lived in Sheff at the time) - but if the crowd are going to steam the gates - which I've seen first hand then that is one of the initial problems the caused the disaster - exacerbated by the terrible Police decisions.

Please try and resist outraged replies of the type above etc etc just because I have a different opinion to yours...

[JamieMoles]

and crowd mentality dictates the rest.

You're a real piece of work CB.

I think you've just made CB's point for him....

[snaw]

I think you've just made CB's point for him....

Those in charge of crowd control are responsible for managing the crowd, not the crowd itself ... even in Britain where we take queuing seriously, a crowd of people is only managable by itself up to a point.

[lukemg]

No axe to grind, tremendous sympathy for those affected, it caused huge on-going trauma to many who were there, lost people etc.
However, text read out on the radio this morning struck a chord, strange how we hear very little about Heysel, Bradford, Kings Cross fire etc in comparison to this. Mistakes made, some people should have been castigated etc for it but certainly no intent, a combination of many factors spanning back years and the desperate search for a scapegoat is starting to look misplaced now.

[JamieMoles]

Those in charge of crowd control are responsible for managing the crowd, not the crowd itself ... even in Britain where we take queuing seriously, a crowd of people is only managable by itself up to a point.

I do agree with you - however when the crowd is actively trying to defeat any "crowd control" measures being used, that same crowd must bear some of the responsibility for the consequences.

[swamp]

Do Liverpool fans mourn the Heysel Stadium disaster?

[M_B]

I found this interesting. Others might too - long read though. Its from http://www.hfdinfo.com/. The numbers in the text are document references that I couldnt be bothered to remove.

Grounds For Concern

The Hillsborough Disaster of 1989 was by no means the first time football
supporters had encountered problems at this specific ground. The turnstiles
frequently could not cope with the number of people awaiting admittance
and, inside the ground, there were recurrent incidents of crushing at the
Leppings Lane End.
The first recorded incident took place in 1981 during the Football Association
(FA) Cup semi-final fixture between Wolverhampton Wanderers Football
Club (Wolves) and Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (Spurs). In spite of
having a larger average following, Spurs’ supporters were given fewer tickets
than Wolves’ and were also allocated the 10,100 capacity Leppings Lane End.
Within minutes of the game starting a crush developed in the stand and
38 Spurs supporters were injured. On this occasion the police allowed the
affected supporters access to the pitch.
Following this incident the FA opted to select other venues to host FA Cup
semi-finals for the next six years. Stadium owners, Sheffield Wednesday
Football Club (SWFC), were prompted to make significant changes to the
Leppings Lane End. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) suggested a reduction
in overall capacity1 and the division of terraces into sections. The idea was
that the capacity could be distributed equally and evenly across the terrace.
Lateral fences were erected on the terrace to create five penned areas.
Despite these changes, there was no reassessment of Leppings Lane’s
capacity. The individual pen capacities were carved from the 10,100 figure.
There was neither any system to count the number of fans entering each
pen nor any system to warn when a pen had reached its capacity. New ideas
were drafted to resolve these issues but never implemented. With no count
system, SWFC was in breach of its safety certificate at every single match.2
It was not until 1987, that problems resurfaced, when the FA reselected
Hillsborough to host the FA Cup semi-final. “There was evidence that the
central pens were uncomfortably overcrowded on that occasion and again
at the 1988 Cup semi-final.” 3
Prior to both the ‘88 and ‘89 games, Liverpool Football Club (LFC) challenged
the decision to allocate the smaller terrace section to their supporters, while
the enormous ‘Kop’ stand went to Nottingham Forest Football Club (NFFC).

The first objection in 1988 was due to the size of the allocation. The second
objection in 1989 was due to the complaints that LFC received from its
supporters, who had experienced crushing in 1988.
Despite the grounds for concern, Hillsborough was once again selected to
host the 1989 FA Cup semi-final match between LFC and NFFC.
The Liverpool End
SYP advised the FA regarding which end of the ground should be given to
which set of supporters, as they had done in 1987 and 1988.
For so-called “safety reasons” 4 SYP repeated in 1989 the ticket and turnstile
allocations of the ‘88 semi-final, with LFC being allocated the north and west
stands, NFFC the south and east stands.
Just as in the previous year, LFC supporters were once again given fewer
tickets than their opponents. Their allocation was 24,000 tickets whereas
NFFC’s was 29,000 tickets.
LFC’s supporters were able to access the stadium through just 23 turnstiles,
whereas NFFC supporters had access through 60 turnstiles.
Turnstile Admission
The 60 turnstiles allocated to NFFC ran the full length of two sides of the
ground, whereas LFC’s turnstiles were all situated at one corner end.
The pressure therefore to admit the given number of LFC supporters was
greater at these turnstiles. ‘’In 1986, a police memorandum written to senior
officers warned that the Leppings Lane turnstiles don’t provide anything
like the access required.’’ 5 That observation went unheeded and admission
to the ground once again proved difficult for supporters.
Although the Leppings Lane End turnstiles were labelled alphabetically,
they did not run in that order, making it hard to follow the directions on the
tickets. In addition, there were insufficient numbers of police officers at hand
to direct supporters or organise queues.
Admission rates proceeded to fall while congestion outside the turnstiles
developed and grew as more fans arrived.

Finding Their Own Level

Supporters who had passed through the turnstiles were left to find their
own way to the terraces.
The option of filling the five pens successively had been rejected by senior
officers. Earlier in the day, Superintendent Bernard Murray told Chief
Inspector Creaser that supporters should be left to “find their own level”.6
With no direction, supporters found that the “obvious” 7 route to the terrace
was via a tunnel. Above the tunnel entrance was the word ‘standing’.
Most standing supporters presumed this was the only route to the terrace.
Many were unaware that there were two other points of access.
There were “no conspicuous signs” 7 to invite supporters to take the
alternative routes. Supporters were “drawn to the tunnel”,7 which led to
only two of the five available pens – the central pens.

The Central Pens

The official combined capacity figure for the central pens was 2,200.8
Later the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) found that figure was too high.
The combined capacity figure should have been reduced to 1,600, as the
crush barriers installed did not conform to paragraph 142 in ‘The Guide to
Safety at Sport 1986.’

Even Distribution Of Supporters

SYP “hoped” 9 that even distribution would be achieved, instead of taking
action to guarantee it. They reasoned that, by leaving all pens open, the
supporters would eventually level themselves out.
Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, the officer in overall charge that
day, assumed any supporters finding the central pens too crowded would
be able “to turn around and walk out”.10 In theory, those fans would then fill
up the emptier pens and distribution would be achieved.
There was, however, only one way for fans to exit the central pens and that
was to go back through, against the flow of incoming supporters, the same
access tunnel which was 40ft in length, dark and had a slope steeper than
the ‘Green Guide’ stipulated.

The option to leave was made more difficult when a police tannoy
announcement requested that supporters in the central pens should move
forward so as to make room for others. By 2:30pm the option was completely
gone, as many supporters within the pens and in the tunnel itself had lost
voluntary control of their direction.
At this point, Duckenfield noted that the central pens were “getting on for
being quite full”.11 Still, no order was given to direct supporters to the emptier
pens. At the subsequent public inquiry, the SYP argued that, although it
was common practice to monitor and close access to pens at league matches,
at FA Cup semi-finals the pens were left open.12
That argument can be rejected easily due to the fact SYP monitored, closed
access to, and “successfully” 13 distributed supporters across the terraces at
the ‘88 semi-final. Mr Lock, SWFC’s Security Officer and a former policeman,
said, “It would have been quite easy to close the centre pens to ensure people
were moved to the side pens.”
Duckenfield admitted that following this procedure was something that
“didn’t cross his mind.” 14 He had only been appointed 21 days before the
match, had no recent experience in policing such a high profile match and
the procedure had not featured in the previous year’s planning.
As a result, numbers in the central pens continued to swell, whilst the wing
pens remained relatively empty. BBC match commentator, John Motson,
noticed the disparity in the pens and made reference to the lack of fans in
the wing areas. Unbeknown to him, there were a substantial number of fans
still outside, awaiting admittance.

“Open The Gate!”

Outside the turnstiles, the congestion had grown so severe that there was a
perceived risk to life. In 1987, when congestion arose at the same turnstiles
due to supporters arriving late, SYP decided to delay kick-off.
Duckenfield, however, decided against this course of action even though
it was requested by PC Buxton, who believed a delayed kick-off would
immediately reduce the pressure.15 At 2:47pm a request was made to open
an exit gate. Five minutes later, Duckenfield agreed to open the gate.

SYP later argued that although they had five minutes to sort how the influx
of fans would be absorbed, they did not do so because they could not have
foreseen the outcome.16
Several witnesses refute this and testified that warnings were given to
officers wanting to open the gates. One officer was reportedly told by a
steward, “No way! There’ll be a crush in there!’’
Turnstile attendant, Colin Milton, said the officer ignored the steward’s
warning.17 Another SWFC steward, Jack Stone, who had been asked four
times for the keys to open Exit Gate A, but refused each time, said in his own
statement, “I knew all hell would be let loose if the gates were opened.” 18
Gate C was opened and, for five minutes, there was an influx of 2,000
supporters into the stadium. Undoubtedly opening the gate relieved the
pressure outside but, with no directive to do otherwise, the majority of
supporters headed for the tunnel leading to the central pens.
Lord Justice Taylor said the decision to open the gate, with no attempt to steer
fans to the emptier wing pens, was “a blunder of the first magnitude.” 19

[M_B]

Post 2

The Notion Of Inrushing Supporters

It is a commonly-held belief that the thousands of Liverpool supporters who
entered via Gate C then rushed into the back of the already-overfull central
pens, with the effect that those supporters at the front were crushed to
death (the BBC’s Politics Show on 2/12/07 contains the latest example of this
supposition. The BBC has since had to apologise for this, as there was never
any evidence to support the view expressed).
CCTV evidence clearly showed supporters entering via Gate C walking across
the concourse and into the tunnel. Taylor revealed that, of those who died
near the front of the pens, “at least 16 and probably 21” 20 came through Gate
C after it had been opened at 2:52pm.
It was estimated that, with the addition of supporters from Gate C, there were
more than 3,000 fans in the central pens, almost double the official capacity.

The Crush

The lateral fences prevented supporters from escaping to the spacious
wing pens, whilst the fences at the front prevented any escape to the pitch.
The influx of supporters from the tunnel prevented a retreat backwards.
With nowhere to go, the pressure built up slowly and increased with each
passing minute. Survivor Eddie Spearitt described the crush as being
“like a vice, getting tighter and tighter.” 21
The intensity of the crush was most severe towards the front of the pens,
where the great majority of victims received their fatal injuries, but there
“were a few fatalities further back.” 22
As a result of the crush, 730 supporters were injured; 96 fatally.

[sasguru]

Hmmm, I don't know much about the incident, but if the posts above are accurate it looks like the police are mainly to blame and not the fans.

[Lambros]

96 died, over 700 injured.

20 years on...
Still no justice for the bereaved.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkhQL6ZfTJ8