(21 December 1996)
The middle-distance and inshore fleets, which are covered by the EU policy, increased in size for most of the Eighties and have started to decline rapidly only in the past few years (when fish stocks all over the world have been under severe pressure). If you exclude the quota-hoppers from the UK figures, the decline is steeper. But the economics of fish is local and variable. Some British ports and some types of vessel have done very well indeed. Huge sums are being paid by British fishermen at this moment, for new super-trawlers.
The demise of the huge trawler ports, such as Hull, Grimsby and Lowestoft, often blamed on Brussels, was caused by the Icelandic and Norwegian cod wars of the Sixties and Seventies. Those two nations extended their fisheries limits to 12, then 50, then 200 miles, ejecting our traditional, long- distance trawler fleets from once-rich hunting grounds for cod and haddock. This had nothing to do with the EU. Euro-sceptics who argue that Britain should join the Icelanders and declare our own 200-mile limit are arguing, in effect, for withdrawal from the EU. It would be politically impossible to squeeze the fish paste back into the tube in any other way.
There can be no doubt that the Common Fisheries Policy has miserably failed to deliver the flourishing fish stocks it promised. Why? Poor policing by national governments; overfishing by all fleets, Britain included; the setting of quotas too high, under political pressure. (This week's quota deal is another classic example of myopia: short-term good news for the industry, at the expense of longer-term pain as stocks decline further.)
But these are arguments for a tougher and more rational fisheries policy; not for British withdrawal. In any case, the quota-hopper problem results directly from British government double-think and double-talk, rather than EU rules.
The demise of the huge trawler ports, such as Hull, Grimsby and Lowestoft, often blamed on Brussels, was caused by the Icelandic and Norwegian cod wars of the Sixties and Seventies. Those two nations extended their fisheries limits to 12, then 50, then 200 miles, ejecting our traditional, long- distance trawler fleets from once-rich hunting grounds for cod and haddock. This had nothing to do with the EU. Euro-sceptics who argue that Britain should join the Icelanders and declare our own 200-mile limit are arguing, in effect, for withdrawal from the EU. It would be politically impossible to squeeze the fish paste back into the tube in any other way.
There can be no doubt that the Common Fisheries Policy has miserably failed to deliver the flourishing fish stocks it promised. Why? Poor policing by national governments; overfishing by all fleets, Britain included; the setting of quotas too high, under political pressure. (This week's quota deal is another classic example of myopia: short-term good news for the industry, at the expense of longer-term pain as stocks decline further.)
But these are arguments for a tougher and more rational fisheries policy; not for British withdrawal. In any case, the quota-hopper problem results directly from British government double-think and double-talk, rather than EU rules.
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