An excellent article in the FT
Brexit transition fails to dodge the perils of leaving the EU
Brexit transition fails to dodge the perils of leaving the EU
The contrast spoke volumes. Emmanuel Macron strode on to a large stage at the Sorbonne university in Paris surrounded by young, smiling students and a bank of yellow and blue EU flags. The French president spoke passionately — at times grandiloquently, at times in detail — about the long-term future of Europe for 100 minutes.
A few days earlier, Theresa May stood in front of a grey Whitehall banner erected in a basement annexe of a church in Florence. Her small audience was made up of British journalists, grim-faced cabinet ministers, and a smattering of local dignitaries. The high point of her 35-minute speech was announcing that the UK would seek a short-term fudge of a two-year “transition” to Brexit.
To any objective observer, the collapse of British statecraft is remarkable. Where British prime ministers in the past would have used the occasion of a major speech overseas to situate the UK in the wider sweep of global affairs, nowadays tactical pronouncements are all that is left.
As if to confirm the collective retreat from strategic thinking among the British political classes, Jeremy Corbyn’s speech, delivered to a rapt audience at Labour’s party conference, was as silent on the question of Britain’s place in Europe as it was sanctimonious. Once again, the Labour leader repeated his party’s banal claim that “access” to the single market should be a priority. He seems unaware of the complexity of the Brexit process — Vanuatu has “access” to the single market, the issue is how to retain membership to it — much as he is unaware of the simplicity of his dilemma if he were to become prime minister: ending austerity is simply impossible if he does not end Brexit.
So where does this bevvy of speeches leave the Brexit talks themselves? More or less where they were before: labouring slowly in the foothills. Good manners dictate that Michel Barnier acknowledged the more positive tone from Mrs May in Florence, but behind the scenes his team remains as perplexed as ever at the lack of substantive progress on key issues like the Irish border.
A two-year transition after we have legally left is both fraught with technical difficulties and is likely to weaken the UK’s negotiating hand
Leading Brexiters once again reached for overstatement, but Mrs May’s speech was thin gruel. Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, claimed that the prime minister set out a “vision of a strong Europe buttressed by a strong UK”, when it did nothing of the sort. Liam Fox, international trade secretary, published an article entitled “we have laid our cards on the table — now it is time for the EU to reveal its hand”. Given that Mrs May said very little of substance about the long-term relationship between the UK and the EU, other than the cryptic assertion that our trade relationship should be less than Norway’s but more than Canada’s, Mr Fox’s words will be regarded in Brussels as deluded as his global search for a cornucopia of instant trade deals.
Neither the prime minister nor Mr Corbyn seem to realise that their doctrine of procrastination — retaining the status quo of our EU membership for a two-year “transition” after we have legally left — is both fraught with technical difficulties and likely to weaken rather than strengthen the UK’s negotiating hand.
How is the UK supposed to stay “in” the legal framework of the EU if we have legally passed the point of no return at the end of March 2019? What happens when new EU rules are produced during the two-year period? What happens if another member state seeks to take the UK to the EU court in Luxembourg? Do we end up obeying EU judges after we have legally left the EU, after all?
Even if these complex legal anomalies could be settled during the transition period, the UK would be placed in an unusually weak position. We would be adhering to the rules of a club we had legally just left and we would have thrown away all the leverage we had as EU members just at the point when we would be hoping to settle the final terms of our departure.
Mrs May and Mr Corbyn have both decided to kick the Brexit can down the road because they want to avoid confronting the splits on Europe in their own parties, and because they are unable to settle on a long-term vision of the UK’s status outside the EU. They both advocate a transition without a destination, a bit like building a bridge without knowing where the shore is.
It is often said that Jean-Claude Juncker and his fearsome sidekick in the European Commission, Martin Selmayr, harbour a personal antipathy to Britain. If that were true, they would not believe their luck. Under the pretext of a transition to Brexit, Britain has just needlessly backed itself into a corner and given the EU27 the whip hand. If and until Britain’s political leaders are able to articulate a coherent, strategic alternative to the UK’s membership of the EU, Britain’s tragic loss of statecraft will only continue.
A few days earlier, Theresa May stood in front of a grey Whitehall banner erected in a basement annexe of a church in Florence. Her small audience was made up of British journalists, grim-faced cabinet ministers, and a smattering of local dignitaries. The high point of her 35-minute speech was announcing that the UK would seek a short-term fudge of a two-year “transition” to Brexit.
To any objective observer, the collapse of British statecraft is remarkable. Where British prime ministers in the past would have used the occasion of a major speech overseas to situate the UK in the wider sweep of global affairs, nowadays tactical pronouncements are all that is left.
As if to confirm the collective retreat from strategic thinking among the British political classes, Jeremy Corbyn’s speech, delivered to a rapt audience at Labour’s party conference, was as silent on the question of Britain’s place in Europe as it was sanctimonious. Once again, the Labour leader repeated his party’s banal claim that “access” to the single market should be a priority. He seems unaware of the complexity of the Brexit process — Vanuatu has “access” to the single market, the issue is how to retain membership to it — much as he is unaware of the simplicity of his dilemma if he were to become prime minister: ending austerity is simply impossible if he does not end Brexit.
So where does this bevvy of speeches leave the Brexit talks themselves? More or less where they were before: labouring slowly in the foothills. Good manners dictate that Michel Barnier acknowledged the more positive tone from Mrs May in Florence, but behind the scenes his team remains as perplexed as ever at the lack of substantive progress on key issues like the Irish border.
A two-year transition after we have legally left is both fraught with technical difficulties and is likely to weaken the UK’s negotiating hand
Leading Brexiters once again reached for overstatement, but Mrs May’s speech was thin gruel. Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, claimed that the prime minister set out a “vision of a strong Europe buttressed by a strong UK”, when it did nothing of the sort. Liam Fox, international trade secretary, published an article entitled “we have laid our cards on the table — now it is time for the EU to reveal its hand”. Given that Mrs May said very little of substance about the long-term relationship between the UK and the EU, other than the cryptic assertion that our trade relationship should be less than Norway’s but more than Canada’s, Mr Fox’s words will be regarded in Brussels as deluded as his global search for a cornucopia of instant trade deals.
Neither the prime minister nor Mr Corbyn seem to realise that their doctrine of procrastination — retaining the status quo of our EU membership for a two-year “transition” after we have legally left — is both fraught with technical difficulties and likely to weaken rather than strengthen the UK’s negotiating hand.
How is the UK supposed to stay “in” the legal framework of the EU if we have legally passed the point of no return at the end of March 2019? What happens when new EU rules are produced during the two-year period? What happens if another member state seeks to take the UK to the EU court in Luxembourg? Do we end up obeying EU judges after we have legally left the EU, after all?
Even if these complex legal anomalies could be settled during the transition period, the UK would be placed in an unusually weak position. We would be adhering to the rules of a club we had legally just left and we would have thrown away all the leverage we had as EU members just at the point when we would be hoping to settle the final terms of our departure.
Mrs May and Mr Corbyn have both decided to kick the Brexit can down the road because they want to avoid confronting the splits on Europe in their own parties, and because they are unable to settle on a long-term vision of the UK’s status outside the EU. They both advocate a transition without a destination, a bit like building a bridge without knowing where the shore is.
It is often said that Jean-Claude Juncker and his fearsome sidekick in the European Commission, Martin Selmayr, harbour a personal antipathy to Britain. If that were true, they would not believe their luck. Under the pretext of a transition to Brexit, Britain has just needlessly backed itself into a corner and given the EU27 the whip hand. If and until Britain’s political leaders are able to articulate a coherent, strategic alternative to the UK’s membership of the EU, Britain’s tragic loss of statecraft will only continue.
Comment